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I. INTRODUCTION
Software and internet connections once were largely confined to
multi-purpose computers housed in rectangular boxes. No longer.
More and more, small, sometimes mobile appliances such as
thermostats, watches, jewelry, and eyewear are being made
available with networking capability.1 These networked objects
make up the growing Internet of Things2-pieces of personal
property that run software and connect to the global Internet. 3
Manufacturers typically require purchasers of these products to
consent to terms of service (ToS) or end-user license agreements
(EUILAs) in order to use them, and these licenses purport to create
restrictions on how the products can be used or transferred. 4
For example, the product "Nest' allows one to control the temperature in one's home
through one's phone, wherever the phone is, so long as it and the Nest thermostat are
connected to the Internet. See Jim Smith, Data Centers and the Internet of Things to Come,
WIRED, http://www.wired.com/insights/2014/03/data-centers-internet-things-come/ (last visited
June 12, 2016). Google Glass and Samsung's Galaxy Gear add networking capability to
eyewear and watches. See John Biggs, Samsung Announces the Galaxy Gear 2 Smart Watch
with Better Battery and Tizen OS, Coming in April, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 23, 2014), http://tech
crunch.com/2014/02/23/samsung-announces-the-galaxy-gear-2-smart-watch-with-better-batte
ry-and-tizen-os-coming-in-apri!; Samuel Gibbs, Samsung Gear 2 Beats Apple to Fitness-
Tracking Smartwatch, GUARDIAN (Feb. 23, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/20
4/feb/23/galaxy-gear-2-samsung-beats-apple-wearable-fitness-tracking-smartwatch. Ringly is
a company selling networked jewelry. Rmgly, https://ringly.coml (last visited June 12, 2016);
see Liz Stinson, This Jewelry Lights Up and Buzzes When Your Phone Needs You, WIRED
(June 10, 2014, 12:00 PM), http://www.wired.com/2014/06/launching-bluetooth-jewelry-that-
helps-filter-your-phone-calls/.
2 See Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps Toward Managing
Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85, 87-117 (2014) (giving
examples of personal property that can connect to the Internet); Smith, supra note 1 (stating
that the Internet of Things is about to go mainstream in a big way); Emily Adler, Here's Why
"The Internet of Things" Will Be Huge, and Drive Tremendous Value for People and Businesses,
Bus. INSIDER (Dec. 7, 2013, 9:38 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/gro wth-in-the-internet-
of-things-2013-10 (estimating that the Internet of Things will account for an increasingly large
number of connections: 1.9 billion devices today and 9 billion by 2018).
3 See Jacob Morgan, A Simple Explanation of "the Internet of Things," FORBES (May 13,
2014, 12:05 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobmorgan/2014/05/13/simple-explanation-int
ernet-things-that-anyone-can-understand#30e72e886828 (defining the "Internet of Things" as
"the concept of basically connecting any device with an on and off switch to the Internet
(and/or to each other)").
4 See, e.g., Apple WatchOS Software License Agreement, APPLE.COM (last visited June
12, 2016) ("By using your Apple Watch or downloading a software update, as applicable, you
are agreeing to be bound by the terms of this license.").
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Under the common law, these licenses would be verboten if the
inside of the product consisted of gears rather than processing
chips-if it were a mechanical Rolex watch rather than a Samsung
Gear smartwatch. 5 But because the products that comprise the
Internet of Things run copyrighted software, manufacturers are
legally permitted to exert downstream control over the
software's-and effectively the product's-usage.6  Although
personal property traditionally cannot be subjected to usage
restrictions or servitudes, 7 judges have been comparatively
comfortable recognizing restrictions on products that run software
(software-embedded goods). 8 Named the "New Servitudes" by
Molly Shaffer Van Houweling,9 this flexibility to create usage and
transfer restrictions on software-embedded products has allowed
for Canon to claim it can prevent digital camera owners from
lending their cameras to others, 10 for Google to forbid resale of its
5 Compare Rolex Watch Collection, http://www.rolex.com/watches.html (last visited June
12, 2016), with Samsung Wearable Technology, http://www.samsung.com/us/mobile/wearab
le-tech (last visited June 10, 2016).
6 See Part III for a discussion of the legal mechanism that allows for greater downstream
control of software-embedded products as compared with analog products.
7 See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 18 (2000) ("[A]lthough the case
law is rather thin, it ... appears that one cannot create servitudes in personal property.');
Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Touching and Concerning Copyright: Real Property
Reasoning in MDY Industries, Inc. v. Blizzard Entertainment, Inc., 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
1063, 1068 (2011) ("While courts have increasingly accommodated land servitudes, the
conventional wisdom under Anglo-American law has been that the types of servitudes that
can be attached to land cannot be attached to chattels.").
8 Dicta from a recent district court case renders less clear whether content owners can
restrict resale of digital content that remains embedded in a particular piece of hardware.
See Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDIGI Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 656 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) ("Section
109(a) [of the Copyright Act] still protects a lawful owner's sale of her 'particular'
phonorecord, be it a computer hard disk, iPod, or other memory device onto which the file
was originally downloaded. While this limitation clearly presents obstacles to resale that
are different from, and perhaps even more onerous than, those involved in the resale of CDs
and cassettes, the limitation is hardly absurd .... ).
9 Molly Shaffer Van Houwelng, The New Servitudes, 96 GEO. L.J. 885, 885-86 (2008).
10 See Elizabeth I. Winston, Why Sell What You Can License? Contracting Around Statutory
Protection of Intellectual Property, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 93, 97 n.13 (2006) (citing Canon
EOS-1D Mark II N Firmware License Agreement Update Version 1.1.12, http://web.canon.jp/
Imaging/eosldm2nleosldmk2n firmware-e.html).
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new product, Google Glass," and for Nest to require its thermostat
only be used for personal, noncommercial purposes. 12
Use and transfer restrictions on software-embedded goods and
other articles protected by intellectual property laws alter one's
relationship with property, a change reflected in the increasingly
popular use of the locution "user" rather than "owner" of an
article.13  These usage restrictions give companies greater
flexibility to price discriminate and unbundle features of their
products. 14 However, those same restrictions also have significant
drawbacks.
This Article primarily focuses on the potential costs presented
by the licensing of networked objects and other intellectual-
property-embedded goods, in part because the key claimed benefits
of licensing-flexibility and price discrimination-have been
discussed and critiqued elsewhere in the context of intellectual
property law by many, including this author. 15 Although this
11 See David Kravets & Roberto Baldwin, Google is Forbidding Users from Reselling,
Loaning Glass Eyewear, WIRED (Apr. 17, 2013, 3:00 PM) http://www.wired.com/gadgetlab/2
013/04/google-glass-resales/ ('"The company's terms of service on the limited-edition
wearable computer specifically states 'you may not resell, loan, transfer, or give your device
to any other person.' ").
12 Nest End User License Agreement, NEST, https://nest.com/legal/eula/ (last visited June
12, 2016).
13 See RICHARD RAYSMAN ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LICENSING 2-6 (2006) ("[Tjhe
software industry traditionally positions its transfers [of its products to consumers] as
licenses, not sales, of both the physical copy and the intellectual property.... enabl[ing] the
rightsholder to restrict further transfers of the software." (footnote omitted)).
14 See OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA AND DIFFERENTIAL PRICING 4, 5 (2015), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/Big-DataReportNonembargo-v2.pdf (defining
price discrimination as "the practice of charging customers different prices for the same
product" and stating that "versioning," a form of price discrimination in which firms produce
multiple versions of a product at different prices, is common in the release of software).
15 For instance, many scholarly articles have discussed price discrimination in the context
of intellectual property law. For examples, see Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Sale Restraints and
Competitive Harm: The First Sale Doctrine in Perspective, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. AM. L. 487,
532 (2011); Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection- A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV.
1813, 1874-75 (1984); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Copyright's Price Discrimination Panacea, 21
HARv. J.L. & TECH. 387 (2008); Michael J. Meurer, Copyright Law and Price Discrimination,
23 CARDOZO L. REV. 55 (2001); Christina Mulligan, A Numerus Clausus Principle for
Intellectual Property, 80 TENN. L. REV. 235, 285-89 (2013); Guy A. Rub, Rebalancing
Copyright Exhaustion, 64 EMORY L.J. 741, 766 (2015); Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and
Product Differentiation, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 212, 270 (2004). See generally Julie E. Cohen,
Copyright and the Perfect Curve, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1799 (2000); John P. Conley & Christopher
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Article sets forth several bases for believing that idiosyncratic
licensing creates economic and social harms, those harms must be
understood alongside and weighed against possible benefits that
arise from price discrimination and flexibility.
The harms of permitting extensive licensing of the Internet of
Things are foreshadowed by scholarship about the structure of
physical property forms. One school of thought, spearheaded by
Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith, warns of the high information
costs that accrue when the forms property interests can take are
too varied.16 Another perspective considers the social and cultural
consequences that occur when the law recognizes particular types
of property interests but not others. 17 This Article applies these
analyses of traditional, physical property to software-embedded
objects and argues that licensing physical objects may result in
more economic and social costs than are worth bearing.
In the course of evaluating the information costs associated
with licensing the Internet of Things, this Article makes a second,
but equally significant, contribution to theories about physical
property forms in Part II. In order to decide how much flexibility
in licensing is appropriate for the Internet of Things, this Article
revisits a near century-old, unanswered question: Why has the
common law evolved to disfavor complex and nonpossessory
personal property interests while allowing comparative flexibility
in real property? By establishing a new framework for deciding
when property interests should be flexible and when they should
be standardized, this Article not only answers a longstanding
question from property law but also renders the answer highly
S. Yoo, Nonrivalry and Price Discrimination in Copyright Economics, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1801
(2009); William W. Fisher III, When Should We Permit Differential Pricing of Information?, 55
UCLA L. REV. 1 (2007).
6 See generally Merrill & Smith, supra note 7 (discussing how the level of standardization
in property rights affects the information costs of relevant parties).
17 See Hanoch Dagan, The Craft of Property, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1517, 1559 (2003)
(discussing how property law reflects underlying social realities and interactions); Joseph
William Singer, Democratic Estates: Property Law in a Free and Democratic Society, 94
CORNELL L. REV. 1009, 1050 (2009) (noting the tension between the right for all property
owners to exclude and the corresponding effect of disallowing the homeless from sleeping
anywhere).
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relevant to some of the most interesting and novel types of
property we encounter today.
Drawing from the comparison between real and personal
property, this Article argues that permitting servitudes or usage
restrictions on software-embedded goods and other goods protected
by intellectual property law has the potential to cause substantial
economic and social harm. Part II of this Article will give a brief
overview of prior discussions of tangible property standardization
and will argue that information costs explain why different
degrees of flexibility are optimal in real and tangible property law.
Part III applies the discussion in Part II to intellectual-property-
embedded goods. Finally, Part IV examines the social
consequences of permitting flexible usage limitations on
networked objects.
II. INFORMATION COSTS FOR LAND AND CHATTELS
This Part investigates potential reasons for the historic
distinction in flexibility between real and personal property rights
by exploring the differences between real and personal property
and assessing why those differences might lead to preferring
different degrees of flexibility depending on the nature of the
property. By discovering the aspects of property that make
greater flexibility or standardization desirable, claims can then be
made about intellectual-property-embedded goods based on
whether they possess qualities that invite flexibility or
standardization.
In the past two hundred years, real property interests have
evolved to include a great deal of flexibility. Equitable servitudes
originated in the 1848 English decision Tulk v. Moxhay,'8 and over
the past several decades, state legislatures have written statutes
to permit the creation of property rights which had been forbidden
under the common law, such as timeshares and condominiums. 19
'8 (1848) 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Ch).
19 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 7, at 16 ("[Clondominiums did not emerge until the
1960s when virtually all states adopted statutes expressly authorizing the creation of
condominiums."). For a discussion of the economic utility of condominiums and timeshares,
[Vol. 50:11211126
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The blossoming of timeshares, condominiums, and servitudes has
dramatically increased variation in real property rights. 20 But as
restrictions on real property forms have eased, personal property
forms have remained-and, indeed, have always been-severely
and comparatively limited.21 For example, statutes authorizing
the creation of time-shares do not extend to personal property.22
And although there are a few odd cases to the contrary, as a
general matter, chattels cannot be burdened with servitudes. 23
While it is well-established that one can create a life-estate in
personal property, "there are few if any cases that address the
question of whether more exotic interests, such as defeasible fees
and executory interests, can be created in personal property. '24
see Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1183-85
(1999).
20 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 7, at 15 ('In terms of creation of new concurrent
interests, the most dramatic development has been the emergence of condominiums and
time-shares."); see also id. at 16-17 ('In response to demand for a more flexible instrument
that would allow the burden of promises to run in planned residential developments, the
English Court of Chancery, in Talk v. Moxhay, in effect created a new interest-the
equitable servitude. This was pure judicial entrepreneurship, as the court was well
aware .... (footnotes omitted)).
21 After Tulk v. Moxhay created equitable servitudes in England, the English Court of
Chancery held that equitable servitudes could not be imposed on chattels. Zechariah
Chafee, Jr., Equitable Servitudes on Chattels, 41 HARV. L. REV. 945, 977-80 (1928)
[hereinafter Chafee 1928]; Merrill & Smith, supra note 7, at 18.
22 Merrill & Smith, supra note 7, at 18.
23 Id. ("[A]lthough the case law is rather thin, it... appears that one cannot create
servitudes in personal property."); Van Houweling, supra note 7, at 1068 ('While courts
have increasingly accommodated land servitudes, the conventional wisdom under Anglo-
American law has long been that the types of servitudes that can be attached to land cannot
be attached to chattels."). Some courts have anomalously recognized particular chattel
servitudes, but those cases tend to be seen as rare exceptions to the general practice and
belief See Merrill & Smith, supra note 7, at 18-19 (noting that "American precedent is
largely, if not quite exclusively, in accord" with English law establishing that servitudes
could not be placed on chattels); Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Music Goes Round and Round:
Equitable Servitudes and Chattels, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1250, 1255-56 (1956) [hereinafter
Chafee 1956] (discussing Pratte v. Balatsos, 113 A.2d 492 (N.H. 1955), which appeared to
recognize a servitude on a jukebox, and noting that "[slince 1928 and until Pratte v.
Balatsos, [the author had] found seven cases of attempts to bind personal property by
restrictions unsanctioned by legislation, and only three of these were successful"); Glen 0.
Robinson, Personal Property Servitudes, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1449, 1455 (2004) (noting that
the author '"ha[d] discovered only a few cases decided since 1956 involving attempts to
create common law servitudes").
24 Merrill & Smith, supra note 7, at 17-18.
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Although several scholars have discussed the disparate
treatment of land and chattels at length, 25 little attempt has been
made to justify or explain the difference in treatment of these two
types of physical property. As a result, we live in a world that
treats usage restrictions on real and personal property very
differently, without really knowing why.
Historically, maintaining different types of interests and
restrictions on land and chattels has been met with skepticism.
For instance, Henry Smith has noted that the suspicion of
servitudes on chattels has been undertheorized. 26 Glen Robinson,
in particular, argued that the distinction fails to hold any water:
"To the extent [particular] restraints [on usage] are valid for real
property, they should be valid, pari passu, for personal property."27
Molly Shaffer Van Houweling has suggested that appropriate
notice could justify enforcing servitudes on personal as well as real
property. 28  And while Lord Coke worried that downstream
restrictions on chattels would limit their alienability, 29 he was
equally concerned with restraints on the alienation of land.3°
25 See, e.g., Chafee 1928, supra note 21 (analyzing the doctrine of equitable servitudes
restricting use rights on land and assessing the desirability of applying similar restrictions
on the use of chattels); Chafee 1956, supra note 23 (exploring the contours of equitable
servitudes in the context of Pratte, embracing such a restriction on the use of a juke box);
Robinson, supra note 23, at 1449 (exploring "the lawfulness of servitudes on personal
property in both common law and intellectual property regimes"). See generally Van
Houweling, supra note 9 (developing a comprehensive account of the equitable servitude
doctrine as applied to both land and personal property in order to evaluate modern use
restrictions on intangible property).
26 Henry E. Smith, Institutions and Indirectness in Intellectual Property, 157 U. PA- L.
REV. 2083, 2122 (2009) ("The law has always been more suspicious of personal than real
property servitudes, but this area of law has been undertheorized.").
27 Robinson, supra note 23, at 1453.
28 Van Houweling, supra note 9, at 907 ("[Int is relatively easy for an item of personal
property to travel with its terms attached directly to it .... [Tihe availability of this type of
express notice might justify applying the logic of Tulk to personal property, enforcing
running restrictions upon a finding of actual notice." (footnotes omitted)).
29 1 E. COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND § 360, at 223 (1628). Coke's discussion
of chattel servitudes was recently discussed by the Supreme Court in Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley
& Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1363 (2013).
30 Chafee 1928, supra note 21, at 982 (citing COKE, supra note 29, § 360) The... passage
from Coke ... is preceded by an equally strong condemnation of similar conditions for the
reverter of real estate. Coke says nothing to indicate that land may be restricted and chattels
may not, or that there is any distinction for this purpose between them." (footnotes omitted)).
1128
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The reason for the difference in treatment between land and
chattels is far from clear, and previous attempts to account for the
absence of chattel servitudes from the law are varied. Henry
Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman noted that courts' historic
rejection of servitudes on chattels "was evidently motivated by
considerations of competition policy that had nothing to do with
the problems of notice that generally lie behind the law's
unaccommodating approach to divided property rights."31
Robinson argued there was simply no market demand for
encumbered objects.32 In a similar vein, Ariel Katz has postulated
that it is "the need to coordinate land use over long periods of time
that creates the need for enforceable use-restrictions" against
future land owners.33 Zechariah Chafee proposed two potential
explanations: that servitudes would interfere with the quick
transfer of chattels, 34 and that there would be "no possibility of
affixing a reasonable termination to the life of the restriction [on a
chattel] coextensive with the realization of [its] purpose." 35
31 Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification: The
Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 373, 417 (2002)
(citing Chafee 1928, supra note 21).
32 Robinson, supra note 23, at 1486. Robinson elaborates:
[Tihe principal constraint on the ability of property owners to carve out
idiosyncratic property interests is not legal but economic .... [Piroperty law
has neither the purpose nor the power to create a market for idiosyncratic
property interests.... [C]ommon law personal property servitudes [a]re
like a liger-a zoo curiosity that, being sterile, cannot reproduce. As with
ligers so with watch time-shares: if tle law allowed the creation of time-
share interests in watches, it would have no more effect on the market for
watches than releasing a sterile liger from the zoo into the wild would have
on the gene pool of feline predators.
Id.
33 Ariel Katz, The First Sale Doctrine and the Economics of Post-Sale Restraints, 2014
BYU L. REv. 55, 97.
34 See Chafee 1928, supra note 21, at 985 ('Land remains in the same hands for
comparatively long periods of time and is transferred after an elaborate investigation of the
title, whereas chattels are ordinarily sold with rapidity, so that possible interferences with
quick transfers are undesirable."); see also Robinson, supra note 23, at 1489 (discussing
Chafee's suggestion).
35 Chafee 1928, supra note 21, at 985. Chafee offered a contrast with the restrictions on
land that "arise from the desire to protect a neighborhood as a rough unit." Id. He wrote,
'The restrictions do not endure forever, but lapse when the preservation of the desired
GEORGL4 LAW REVIEW
Particular types of restrictions on chattels, such as resale price
restrictions and tying arrangements, have been explicitly
disfavored to prevent restraint of trade, but the reasoning of those
cases is closely tied to the content of the restriction rather than to
a general policy concerning personal property rights. 6
The literature on the information costs associated with property
use and transfer provides a more convincing explanation for the
difference in treatment between land and chattels. Thomas
Merrill and Henry Smith have written that limited forms of
property rights-"the numerus clausus principle"-can be
defended on the basis of the costs associated with investigating the
scope of property rights, 37 particularly the costs borne by third
parties who were not present when a property right was being
crafted or negotiated. 38 Using or transferring property requires
one to understand the scope of the property interest and any
restrictions on how it can be used. Learning these facts can be
costly, especially if it is difficult to locate and understand the
relevant information. Merrill and Smith argue that these
information or measurement costs are higher when property can
be held in more varied ways because variety increases the cost of
investigating and understanding the scope of one's property
interests. 39  They specifically argue there is some optimal
neighborhood standard can no longer be accomplished. In the case of chattels, it might be
argued that there is nothing analogous to a neighborhood purpose .. " Id.
36 See Katz, supra note 33, at 71 ("Early antitrust law... treated many agreements
imposing vertical restraints, such as exclusive dealing, tying, and resale price maintenance,
as per se illegal.").
37 See generally Merrill & Smith, supra note 7.
38 Merrill and Smith explain:
A and B may have subjective reasons for creating [idiosyncratic] property
rights .... But, the possible existence of such rights will cause information
costs for others.., to rise. Those considering whether to purchase property
rights ... will have more to investigate: They will have to assure
themselves that they are getting all the [rights] that they want.
Furthermore, they will have to worry about dimensions of division and
elaboration that perhaps no one has yet thought of, making the acquisition
of any [similar piece of property] more uncertain as well as riskier.
Id. at 32.
39 Id. at 26-27 ("Parties who create new property rights will not take into account the full
magnitude of the measurement costs they impose on strangers to the title."); id. at 45 ('The
[Vol. 50:11211130
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standardization in property rights-enough flexibility that one can
generally achieve one's goals, but not so much flexibility that the
transaction costs of property use and transfer are too high.40
However, Merrill and Smith don't provide a rubric for how to
figure out what the right amount of standardization should be, nor
do they discuss whether the "optimal standardization" would be
different for different kinds of property. Instead, they state
generally that "the numerus clausus strikes a rough balance
between the extremes of complete regimentation and complete
freedom of customization, and thus leads to a system of property
rights that is closer to being optimal than that which would be
produced by either of the extreme positions."41 For Merrill and
Smith, title recording systems and other forms of notice do not
obviate the need for standardization, because the costs of
understanding a property right still rise as the terms of the
records get more lengthy, complicated, and difficult to
understand.42
Merrill and Smith's information cost analysis leads to a useful
clue as to why the law concerning land and chattels may have
evolved differently. If the measurement costs for using and
transferring chattels, as compared to land, rise more quickly as
property standardization decreases, then the point of "optimal
standardization" would be higher for chattels than for land.43
This Part will investigate the information costs associated with
understanding the scope of real and personal property rights from
three perspectives: the absolute cost of understanding a particular
very existence of idiosyncratic, hard-to-process property rights makes information about
property rights in general harder to process.").
40 Id. at 38 ("From a social point of view, the objective should be to minimize the sum of
measurement (and error) costs, frustration costs, and administrative costs. In other words,
what we want is not maximal standardization-or no standardization-but optimal
standardization.").
41 Id. at 40.
42 See id. at 43-45 (discussing how, even when notice is furnished, the costs of
understanding property rights remain high where unstandardized lengthy idiosyncrasies
must be processed in order to understand the property rights at issue).
43 See id. at 33 (suggesting that the higher the costs of measurement in regards to
property rights, the greater the need for more standardization in order to accurately process
those property rights).
20161 1131
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piece of property, the cost relative to potential losses from misuse
or mistake, and the aggregate cost of understanding all the
property one encounters. Information costs can consist of both
discovery costs and processing costs. For the purpose of this
Article, discovery costs are the costs of locating the information
necessary to understand the scope of the property interest, such as
the cost associated with finding a deed or matching a piece of
property with a document describing a restriction or ownership
structure.44 Processing costs are the costs incurred by parties
trying to understand the scope of a property interest once they
have acquired all the relevant information. 4 5
For simplification, this Part will presume that the information
cost burdens associated with granting revocable, bare licenses6 to
use a chattel or walk on a piece of land are borne by a current
property owner, rather than the bare licensee. As we find in our
own practical experience, the bare licensee usually trusts the
owner without engaging in a separate investigation of the owner's
property rights and rarely suffers from good-faith incorrect usage
of the property. Similarly, the acts of complying with duties of
4- Discovery costs are one of the types of transaction costs identified by Ronald Coase in
The Problem of Social Cost. Coase explained:
In order to carry out a market transaction it is necessary to discover who it
is that one wishes to deal with, to inform people that one wishes to deal and
on what terms, to conduct negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw up
the contract, to undertake the inspection needed to make sure that the
terms of the contract are being observed, and so on. These operations are
often extremely costly, sufficiently costly at any rate to prevent many
transactions that would be carried out in a world in which the pricing
system worked without cost.
R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960) (emphasis added); see
also Christina Mulligan & Timothy B. Lee, Scaling the Patent System, 68 N.Y.U. ANN.
SuRv. AM. L. 289, 291 (2012) (discussing the discovery costs associated with determining
whether one's product infringes another's patent).
45 See Henry Smith, The Language of Property: Form, Context, and Audience, 55 STAN. L.
REV. 1105, 1108 (2003) (defining "processing costs" broadly as the costs incurred by one
interpreting the information that has been communicated in a message).
46 A bare license is a "license in which no property interest passes to the licensee, who is
merely not a trespasser. It is revocable at will." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1002 (9th ed.
2009).
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abstention or simple avoidance of property in which one does not
have an interest are considered very low cost.47
A. ABSOLUTE INFORMATION COSTS
One possibility is that greater standardization in property
forms is appropriate for chattels because the information costs
associated with understanding the interests in the average piece of
personal property are higher than for the average piece of land.
Several qualities of chattels make this hypothesis appealing,
specifically their size, mobility, and fungibility.
The largest pieces of personal property are objects like
airplanes and trains. In one's private life, it is rare to buy, sell, or
rent an object larger than a car or grand piano--both of which are
easily smaller than most pieces of real property. Their size
correlates with high potential for mobility. Most personal
property, from pencils and cups to jewelry and fine art, can move
with trivial effort from one location to another. Chattels are also
frequently fungible, or at least challenging to differentiate. 48
Many mass-produced factory items are identical in all meaningful
respects. 49 Even many unique items, such as gemstones and
naturally-grown items, are difficult to distinguish between without
learned expertise and detailed recordkeeping about defects and
size, or the presence of unique identifiers like serial numbers.
Certainly, not all chattels are small, mobile, and fungible. The
Hope Diamond 5° is small and mobile, but many nonexpert
47 See J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 27 (1997) ("[Our duty is not to
trespass on the private property of others.., it is a simple, single duty, and very easy to
comply with."); Smith, supra note 45, at 1117 ("I know not to take a car parked on the street
without knowing anything about its owner (other than it is not me)."); see also Henry Smith,
Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 1703 (2012) ('l]f a car is not mine, I
do not need to know who owns it, whether it is subject to a security interest or lease, and so
forth, in order to know not to take or damage it.").
48 See Matt Corriel, Comment, Up for Grabs: A Workable System for the Unilateral
Acquisition of Chattels, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 807, 839 (2013) ("Fungible chattels, or
interchangeable chattels, make up the vast majority of objects in modern American life.").
19 See Design & Technology: Industrial Practices, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/schools/gcse
bitesize/design/resistantmaterials/processindpracrevl.shtml (last visited June 16, 2016).
50 DEP'T OF MINERAL SCIS., The Hope Diamond, SMITHSONIAN, http://www.si.edu/Encyclo
pediaSI/nmnh/hope.htm (last visited June 15, 2016).
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individuals could identify it from among other gems (excepting
attempts at forgery). Passenger train cars rival the size of many
Manhattan apartments, but are relatively mobile and fungible.
And heavy sculptures involving complex engineering may be small
and, at least theoretically, fungible, but are very difficult to move.
Nonetheless, most chattels possess all three qualities-pens,
cufflinks, coffee mugs, toasters, desk chairs. Nearly all possess at
least two. And these qualities each raise the information costs of
property usage for a chattel. Consider an attempt to investigate
whether there are any usage restrictions on a piece of land. Many
locations now have organized, central record-keeping systems. 51
But even in the absence of a reputable record-keeper, a potential
buyer of real property often does not have to go far to locate the
apparent current owner and neighbors. Any documentation
purporting to explain a restriction can easily identify the property
by describing its physical location, address, or geographical
coordinates. This is not to say that boundaries are never unclear
or mistaken or that records are never lost.52  But recording
systems and private record-keeping can usually inform someone
interested in interacting with a piece of property of how it is
divided and how it can be used, with little concern that a record
mistakenly refers to a different piece of property.
Chattels present a greater challenge. Consider the
counterfactual universe where usage restrictions can run on
chattels at the will of the manufacturer and where a manufacturer
51 See BARLOW BURKE, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 167
(Vicki Been et al. eds., 4th ed. 2006) ("Every state has enacted a statute establishing the
office ... for the receipt and maintenance of documents relating to the transfer and
ownership of titles to real property.").
52 Adam Mossoff contests the assumption that the boundaries of land interests are easy
to measure in his essay, The Trespass Fallacy in Patent Law, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1687 (2013).
Mossoff stated that "there are no formal empirical studies of how trespass or other real
estate boundaries function in litigation." Id. at 1692. Tun-Jen Chiang responded to
Mossoffs essay by arguing that "based on our everyday experiences, the real property
system seems to work reasonably well because we don't feel too uncertain about our real
property rights and don't get into too many disputes with our neighbors. This is admittedly
a loose intuition, but it is not an idealization .... " Tun-Jen Chiang, The Trespass Fallacy
in Patent Law, PRAWFSBLAWG (Aug. 23, 2012, 11:27 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.coml
prawfsblawg/2012/08/the-trespass-fallacy-in-patent-law.html.
[Vol. 50:11211134
PERSONAL PROPERTY SERVITUDES
produces a line of crystal glassware that could only be used by
certain licensed persons. Like most chattels, each glass is small,
mobile, and fungible.53 Fungibility raises the costs of using and
conveying the property. There are many glasses; when the owner
is trying to decide if she wants to hand a particular glass to a
houseguest, she must try to remember whether this was the glass
that was burdened with a usage restriction or whether it was some
other, similar-looking glass in her cabinet. If she wants to give
away or sell the glass, the successor in interest may similarly have
difficulty establishing to his satisfaction whether some document
that purports to describe the burdened glass actually referred to
the particular glass under consideration.
The problem of fungibility is compounded by the size and
mobility of chattels. Because real property is large and immobile,
it is comparatively easy to identify based on where it is.54 For
similar reasons, it is easy to organize and locate records
concerning property based on geographic location.55  In
comparison, determining which chattel is burdened by what legal
instrument is more difficult, even if the chattel is actually unique.
A chattel cannot be uniquely identified by location because it can
move.5 6 The glass in question, for instance, might have been
burdened in New York and then moved to Los Angeles. 57 So it
must either be described precisely, possess a unique identifier, or
53 See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text (discussing the three key properties of
chattels).
54 See John Patrick Hunt, Should the Mortgage Follow the Note?, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 155,
190 (2014) ("Property that is immobile can be identified by its location.").
55 See Mulligan & Lee, supra note 44, at 296 ("Real property claims are indexable
because they can be organized by their geographic location.").
5 See Hunt, supra note 54, at 190 ("[F]iling systems are most appropriate for immobile
property.").
57 Further complicating the matter of usage restrictions on chattels is how choice of law
issues will be resolved as mobile chattels move between states, which would undoubtedly
develop some variation in their laws. The European Union is currently struggling with
harmonization of its property law, as the numerus clausus principle in Europe varies
among countries. See generally Bram Akkermans & Eveline Ramaekers, Free Movement of
Goods and Property Law, 19 EUR. L.J. 237 (2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1617182; Sjef
van Erp, European Property Law: A Methodology for the Future, in EUROPEAN PRIVATE
LAW-CURRENT STATUS AND PERSPECTIVES (R. Schulze & Hans Schulte-Nlke eds., 2011),
http://ssrn.com/abstract--1734633.
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some combination of the two. Although it is conceivably possible
to place unique identifiers on many chattels, identifiers can be
removed, and some objects are too small to easily place a visible
serial number on. It is also easy to imagine a frustrated owner
scraping off an encumbered object's serial number and passing it
off as a chattel held in fee simple. Unless all objects, or objects of a
certain type, had unique identifiers, or every object were required
to have a chain of title associated with it, obscuring the true
identity of a chattel would be easy.
Theoretical matters aside, chattels are typically not labeled
with unique identifiers. Limited run artwork is one common
exception; 58 computers are another. But, while product packages
are often manufactured with serial numbers, many small products
cannot be labeled easily if separated from their packaging. Absent
unique identifiers or physically-affixed notice, one would expect
the discovery costs associated with understanding usage
restrictions or divided interests on a chattel to be higher than a
piece of land.
Alone, the higher "absolute" information costs associated with
chattels are not necessarily a convincing justification for greater
standardization in personal property rights. The mere fact that
there is, on balance, a difference in the information costs of
interacting with chattels and land does not tell us whether the
information costs for transferring chattels are higher enough than
the costs of transferring real property to justify different rules,
especially when some land will be costly to investigate and some
chattels will be comparatively inexpensive. But, there are
additional reasons to draw a categorical distinction.
B. RELATIVE INFORMATION COSTS
In many cases, the significant difference between personal and
real property is not the absolute information cost of investigating
58 See Bruce W. Burton, In Search of John Constable's The White Horse: A Case Study in
Tortured Provenance and Proposal for a Torrens-Like System of Title Registration for
Artwork, 59 FLA. L. REV. 531, 579 (2007) ('There are no public title records for artwork as
there are for land, but there are repositories of needed information.").
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potential property burdens but the information cost relative to the
value of the good in question. Again consider the counterfactually
burdened crystal glass worth $100 and an encumbered piece of
land, which would be worth $100,000 when held in fee simple. If it
costs a potential buyer $200 worth of expenditures and person-
hours to discover and comprehend the property restrictions on the
piece of land, he can spend that $200 to save a great deal more,
namely the loss associated with mistakenly using the property
incorrectly or overpayment from the mistaken belief that the
interest was undivided or unencumbered. If the entire property
interest would be worth $100,000, but there is an easement
running across it, the buyer may decide that it is only worth
$90,000 and offer a lower bid for the property, potentially saving
himself $10,000-far more than the $200 information cost.
Discovering a usage restriction after purchase would still be
valuable if it prevents an owner from acting in a way that would
cause over $200 in loss or damages. For example, if the owner was
inclined to put a $1,000 statue on the property that would violate a
servitude and discovers that he may not, he has saved himself
$800 because he would no longer put up, and then be forced to
remove, the statue.
The situation with comparatively inexpensive chattels can be
different. It is simply not worth spending $200 to discover how
one can use the $100 glassware. Even if the glass turns out to be
worthless to the owner, or if he misuses or interferes with
another's rights to the glass, it is likely that the owner will lose
$100 or less due to the misuse of the property, or to make another
interested party whole, absent punitive damages. It is not worth it
to an owner to spend $200 to learn whether he can prevent the loss
of $100.
Due to the low value of chattels, the information costs of
learning about the property interests in a chattel will frequently
be higher than the value of the chattel and any loss from incorrect
usage. As a result, it will often be economically preferable to
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ignore servitudes and complex interests on chattels because it will
not be worth investigating what they are.5 9
This conclusion does not fully answer why the law should treat
chattels differently than real property; it merely descriptively
explains why it would typically not be economically beneficial to
identify and respect complex personal property interests if they
were permitted. Nonetheless, one goal of property law is to
promote efficient uses of property,60 and legal rules that encourage
inefficient expenditures cut against that goal. While some people
will coolly decide that it is not worth doing a record search on a
cheap glass, others will feel a moral obligation to respect others'
rights and follow the law, even at a significant economic loss to
themselves.6 1
One might also consider the relative information costs
associated with using and transferring property over time. Most
59 See generally Louis Kaplow, A Model of the Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules, 11 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 150 (1995) (arguing that rules will not affect behavior where they are
complex enough that the costs of following them exceed liability for violations) (cited in
Smith, supra note 45, at 1146); see also Robinson, supra note 23, at 1486 ("[T]he rational
buyer will invest in information about a good (including information about the rights
associated with it) only up to the point where marginal gains equal marginal cost. For low-
valued goods this investment would be very low."); Smith, supra note 45, at 1146 ("Each
dutyholder will engage in measurement up to the point where the added benefit in expected
liability saved equals the additional cost of measurement .... If rights become too difficult
to process, violation and liability might be the better choice." (footnotes omitted)).
60 See, e.g., DAVID M. DRIESEN, THE ECONOMIC DYNAMICS OF LAW 122 (2012) ('This
emphasis on property as a mere adjunct to transactions leads to an emphasis on efficiency
as property law's primary goal.").
61 Merrill and Smith argue:
Property can function as property only if the vast preponderance of persons
recognize that property is a moral right, and this requirement has
important consequences for the study of property. For property to serve as
an in rem coordination device, the morality upon which it rests must be
simple and accessible to all members of the community.... Pragmatism is
too uncertain, and case-specific cost- benefit analysis is too demanding and
error-prone, to supply the kind of robust and widely accepted moral
understanding needed to sustain a system of property.
Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1849, 1850-51 (2007); see also Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90
VA L. REV. 465, 516 (2004) ('When boundaries are difficult for observers to decipher... the
chances are high that observers will inadvertently infringe or will spend inefficient amounts
of time and cognitive resources attempting to determine the contours of the many facets of
the propertarian relationship.").
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pieces of personal property decline in value as they age.6 2 As a
result, the information costs that might accrue over several owners
and alterations to the property interests are more likely to become
greater than the value of the chattel, even if they were at one time
less. In contrast, land and personal property like fine art are more
likely to gain value over time,63 and are better suited to bear the
costs associated with fragmented or restricted interests as a result.
Notably, fine art is frequently made subject to usage and transfer
restrictions arranged by contract. 64  The change in value of
depreciating assets also recalls Chafee's hypothesis that a
motivation behind the prohibition on personal property servitudes
was the need to eventually recycle or otherwise fundamentally
alter tangible assets. 65 High information costs and low value
undercut incentives to radically repurpose an obsolete good.
C. AGGREGATE INFORMATION COSTS
But perhaps the best explanation for highly standardized
property rights in chattels is the difference in the aggregate
information costs associated with interacting with land and
chattels.
In terms of real property, the total cost of investigating every
piece of property with which one interacts on a given day is low.
There are properties one is interested in buying, selling, or using,
62 See Depreciation Guide (Personal Property), CLAIMS PAGES, http://www.claimspages.
comldocuments/i777/depreciation-guide-(personal-property)/ (last visited June 16, 2016).
63 See, e.g., Matt Rand, Art Appreciation, FORBES (Mar. 12, 2004, 4:59 PM), http://www.
forbes.com/2004/03/12/cz-mr 0315soapbox.html (stating that Andy Warhol's Orange
Marilyn silkscreens appreciated in value from $2,400 in the 1960s to $17 million in the
early 2000s).
64 See, e.g., Seth Siegelaub, The Artist's Reserved Rights Transfer and Sale Agreement, 6
LEONARDO 347, 347-50 (1973) (form contract binding a purchaser of art to a variety of terms,
including non-destruction of the work, and requiring that the purchaser pay 15% of the work's
appreciated value upon resale). Attempts to make the Artist's Reserved Rights Transfer &
Sale Agreement bind future owners of the work may not be legally enforceable and would not
be under the traditional common law of chattel property. Cf. Tiernan Morgan & Lauren
Purje, An Illustrated Guide to Artist Resale Royalties (aka Droit de Suite'), HYPERALLERGIC
(Oct. 24, 2014), http://hyperallergic.com/153681/an-illustrated-guide-to-artist-resale-royalties-
aka-droit-de-suite/ ('The legality of ARRTSA remains questionable .... ).
6.5 See Chafee 1928, supra note 21, at 985 (discussing arguments for limiting equitable
servitudes to real property).
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and for everyone but the largest real estate tycoon, the number of
such properties is very low. Because houses are expensive, and
because they are rarely purchased and sold, it is not unreasonable
to expect that every person thinking of buying or selling a piece of
property, or using it in a meaningful way such as by farming or
building on it, would be able to take the time and expend the cost
to investigate the metes and bounds of their potential or actual
interest. Considering one's total available time and resources, it is
generally possible to investigate every real property interest one
wants to make use of, buy, or sell.
In contrast, consider the number of chattels with which one
interacts each day. If usage restrictions were allowed to run on all
of them, the costs associated with understanding permitted usage
would quickly balloon to consume more time than any person has
and can reasonably devote to understanding the scope of one's
property rights. Can you lend your younger sibling that shirt?
Can the gemstone be cut out of its setting? Can it be irrevocably
broken into pieces? Can those plants be resold? Can their seeds
be planted? Each of these questions may not take much time to
answer, but answering all of these questions may be impracticable
for a person to complete. And, as Merrill and Smith point out,
even if most chattels are held in fee simple, the fact that some are
subject to usage restrictions and servitudes raises the cost of
investigating all of them, because one does not know whether a
particular chattel is held in fee simple until the scope of rights has
already been investigated. 66
Creating separate levels of standardization for land and
chattels prevents the cost of investigating all potentially-burdened
objects from getting too large. It is easy to identify whether
66 Merrill & Smith, supra note 7, at 26-27 ("Parties who create new property rights will
not take into account the full magnitude of the measurement costs they impose on strangers
to the title.... Given the awareness that someone has created a Monday-only right, anyone
else buying a watch must now also investigate whether any particular watch does not
include Monday rights. Thus, by allowing even one person to create an idiosyncratic
property right, the information processing costs of all persons who have existing or potential
interests in this type of property go up." (footnotes omitted)); see also id. at 47
("[S]tandardization is imposed to control a negative externality created by the prospect that
a few persons will deviate from popular forms.").
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something is real or personal property. If it is personal property,
the investigation about burdens can effectively end there. If it is
real property, in-depth investigations can be necessary but
manageable in the aggregate.
This observation does not prove that chattels should never be
burdenable with servitudes or divided into complex interests. But
it does indicate that, in order to keep the aggregate costs of
property investigations manageable, the universe of potentially-
burdenable property should be (1) readily identifiable as a
burdenable type of thing, and (2) rarely encountered. Potentially
burdenable property should be readily identifiable as such so that
one does not mistakenly expend costs on objects that can only be
subject to simple, easily-identifiable interests. And potentially
burdenable property should be rarely encountered so that, in the
aggregate, the costs of investigating those pieces of property
remain low. Besides land, cars are a type of property that may be
good candidates for complex interests. It is generally easy to
distinguish cars from other types of property, and most people buy,
sell, and use only a few cars over long periods of time.
In contrast, some classes of valuable chattels, such as large
gemstones, would be poor candidates for complex interests because
they would fail to be easily distinguishable from other chattels.
The difference in value between large, valuable stones and small,
commodity stones will exist on a spectrum and also be related to
what kind of substance the stones are made of. Even if small
stones were not burdenable, many might still expend unnecessary
resources investigating the nature of thie property rights
associated with them by mistake, because the distinction between
small, unburdenable and valuable, burdenable stones will not be
clear. As a result, permitting complex interests for valuable
jewelry could create unreasonably high aggregate measurement
costs for those who buy, sell, and use other jewelry.
The upshot is, where measurement costs are concerned, there's
nothing particularly exceptional about land. Creating flexibility in
ownership in any class of physical object will create corresponding
costs. The key is to allow enough flexibility for individuals to
achieve their goals without bearing burdensome costs. Based on
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how much cost a degree of flexibility creates, the degree of
flexibility appropriate for a type of property will vary. Although
there are a variety of reasonable ways the numerus clausus
principle could have developed as applied to land and chattels, 67
the separation into two basic regimes turns out to be a good rough
cut at permitting beneficial flexibility while keeping costs low
enough.
III. APPLICATIONS OF INFORMATION COST THEORY
The previous Part of this Article was an exercise in explaining
the status quo--significant flexibility for land, comparably
extreme standardization for chattels. But the emergence and
growing popularity of networked objects has raised new and
increasingly pressing questions about how the law should
approach use restrictions on intellectual-property-embedded goods.
How does the information cost analysis apply to personal property
that is patented or contains a copyrighted work?
Traditionally, intellectual-property-embedded goods have
functioned under rules similar to chattel property. Unprotected
personal property, particular copies of copyrighted works, and
patented goods have all been subject to the "first sale doctrine," a
principle which prohibits servitudes and other downstream control
of a good by its manufacturer or prior owner after its initial
distribution.68 In patent law, the rule remains a judge-created
doctrine, more commonly known as the doctrine of exhaustion. 69
Copyright's first sale doctrine was famously stated in the 1908
67 Indeed, the numerus clausus principle has developed in European countries in a
variety of ways. See generally BRAM AKKERMANS, THE PRINCIPLE OF NUMERUS CLAUSUS IN
EUROPEAN PROPERTY (2008).
68 Hovenkamp, supra note 15, at 511.
69 See id. (describing the first sale rule in the patent context); see also Adams v. Burke, 84
U.S. 453, 456-57 (1873) ("[W]e hold that in the class of machines or implements we have
described, when they are once lawfully made and sold, there is no restriction on their use to
be implied for the benefit of the patentee or his assignees or licensees."); Adams v. Burks, 1
F. Cas. 100, 1000 (C.C.D. Mass. 1871), aff'd sub nom. Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453 (1873)
("When a patented product passes lawfully into the hands of a purchaser without condition
or restriction, it is no longer within the monopoly or under the protection of the patent act,
but outside of it.").
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Supreme Court opinion, Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus,70 which held
that books containing copyrighted works could not be subject to a
requirement that they be sold at a particular price.71 The result
was later codified in the 1909 Copyright Act. 72
In intellectual property law, the first sale doctrine plays the
same role as it does in personal property law. By preventing
manufacturers or previous owners from placing restrictions on
how a good may be used after its initial distribution, it becomes
inexpensive, from an information cost perspective, for an owner to
allow it to be repurposed or transferred to someone else.
Two significant exceptions to the first sale doctrine have
developed that allow for usage restrictions to run on some
intellectual-property-embedded chattels. First, the Federal Circuit
has allowed for patented goods to be sold subject to certain usage
conditions, on the theory that if the patent holder does not have to
grant any rights to a buyer, it may grant whatever combination of
rights it chooses. 73 Although sales of a patented good would
generally trigger exhaustion of the patent owner's rights and
prevent any further downstream control of the good by the patent
holder, the Federal Circuit has allowed restrictions to run on a
patented chattel "even when the chattel is sold if notice is given of
the restrictions, such restrictions are within the scope of the
patent grant, and the patent rights have not yet been
exhausted."74
70 210 U.S. 339 (1908).
7' Id. at 351.
72 Section 41 of the Copyright Act of 1909 provided, "[N]othing in this Act shall be
deemed to forbid, prevent, or restrict the transfer of any copy of a copyrighted work the
possession of which has been lawfully obtained." Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349,
§ 41, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909).
73 See, e.g., Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. MediPart Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 703 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ('The
enforceability of restrictions on the use of patented goods derives from the patent grant,
which is in classical terms of property: the right to exclude .... This right to exclude may
be waived in whole or in part.").
74 Winston, supra note 10, at 108; see also B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d
1419, 1426-27 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that patent exhaustion "does not apply to an
expressly conditional sale or license"); Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 709 (holding that a
patentee could prevent reuse of a patented device if the device was labeled for a single use).
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Second, courts' treatment of copyrighted software has evolved to
allow for ongoing, downstream restrictions on how software can be
used and when it can be transferred. The mechanism by which
the first sale doctrine gets circumvented in the context of software
is tied to how a computer running a software program works. In
1993, the Ninth Circuit held in MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak
Computer, Inc.75 that, because running a program created a
temporary copy in a computer's Random Access Memory (RAM),
running a software program constituted prima facie copyright
infringement of a copyright owner's exclusive right to reproduce a
copyrighted work.76  Although MAI Systems was initially
controversial, two years later, President Bill Clinton's Working
Group on Intellectual Property released a White Paper expressing
the view that MAI Systems was a correctly decided and routine
application of the law. 77 The White Paper concluded that any use
of a digital work constituted a prima facie copyright infringement
because any copy of a work loaded into a computer's RAM
constituted an actionable copy under the copyright statute. 78 As a
75 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993).
76 Id. at 518; see also JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 92 (2001) ("For all works
encoded in digital form, any act of reading or viewing the work would require the use of a
computer... and would, under this interpretation, involve an actionable reproduction.").
Although 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1) permits an "owner of a copy of a computer program to
make ... another copy.., of that computer program provided... that such a new
copy.., is created as an essential step in the utilization of the computer program in
conjunction with a machine and that it is used in no other manner," this "essential step"
exception does not apply to copying software that has been licensed but not sold. 17 U.S.C.
§ 117(a)(1) (2012).
77 LITMAN, supra note 76, at 94-95.
78 See BRUCE A. LEHMAN & RONALD H. BROWN, WORKING GRP. ON INTELLECTUAL PROP.
RIGHTS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE
REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 65-66 (1995)
[hereinafter White Paper], http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/doc/ipnii/ipnii.pdf ('The
1976 Copyright Act... and repeated holdings by courts make it clear that in each of the
instances set out below, one or more copies is made[:] When a work is placed into a
computer, whether on a disk, diskette, ROM, or other storage device or in RAM for more
than a very brief period, a copy is made." (footnotes omitted)). The prevailing interpretation
of MAI Systems has, however, been called into question. In 2008, the Second Circuit held
that while "loading a program into a computer's RAM can result in copying that program,"
it did not read MAI Systems as holding that, as a matter of law, 'loading a program into a
form of RAM always results in copying." Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc.,
536 F.3d 121, 128 (2d Cir. 2008). Cartoon Network emphasized that a copy still needed to
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result, the White Paper argued copyright owners had the right to
control whether and how someone read, listened to, or viewed a
digital work, even though the copyright statute did not allow
copyright holders to exert the same control over the use of non-
digital works. 79 While the copyright statute does grant owners of
copyrighted software the right to make copies that are an
"essential step" to using the program (e.g., making RAM copies),80
this purported limitation on the rights of copyright owners does
little work in practice. Most software copyright owners instead
choose to license their software programs and reserve whatever
rights they choose concerning how and when the program may be
used.81  The resulting "terms of use" or "end-user license
agreements" that arrive with software programs are frequently
pages long and as idiosyncratic as contracts.8 2
Despite these deviations, the similarities between unprotected
goods and intellectual-property-embedded goods suggest that the
exceptions to the first sale doctrine for conditionally-sold patented
goods and software-embedded goods ought to be met with
skepticism. Part II described how property that is best suited to
bear high information costs and flexibility, such as land, is (1) easy
to repeatedly identify and track, (2) highly valuable and likely to
maintain or increase its value, (3) readily identifiable as the type
of property that is burdenable, and (4) rarely encountered. In
contrast, property best suited for inflexible standardization is (1)
fungible, mobile, (2) low value and likely to decrease in value, (3)
difficult to distinguish from unburdenable objects, and (4)
frequently encountered. Pieces of personal property that
be fixed for longer than a "transitory duration" to qualify as a potentially infringing copy
under 17 U.S.C. § 101. Id. at 128-30. For an alternate theory of how digital copies should
be treated under copyright law, see generally Aaron Perzanowski, Fixing RAM Copies, 104
Nw. U. L. REV. 1067 (2010) (providing three considerations in determining the meaning of
"transitory duration" that are easier to predict than the holding in Cartoon Network).
79 LITMAN, supra note 76, at 94-95 (citing White Paper, supra note 78, at 19-130).
80 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1) (2012).
81 See Michael J. Madison, Reconstructing the Software License, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 275,
276 (2003) ("For all intents and purposes, according to software licenses themselves, copies
of computer programs are never sold outright. They are always licensed.... [Tihe world of
software is effectively governed by the very concept of the license.').
82 See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
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incorporate an intellectual-property-protected element tend to
possess the qualities of property best suited to standardization.8 3
They are fungible, mobile, inexpensive, likely to become obsolete
rather than collector's items, difficult to distinguish from other
pieces of personal property, and they may be encountered with
some frequency. But certainly, these statements are more and less
true depending on what type of intellectual-property-embedded
good one is considering.8 4 This Part considers how information
costs of use and transfer affect three kinds of intellectual-property-
embedded goods: the software-embedded goods that comprise the
Internet of Things, other static chattels that include copyrighted
elements, and digital goods which need not be associated with a
specific object or chassis.
A. THE INTERNET OF THINGS
For the past few decades, most licensed software was run on
general-purpose computers, such as the typical desktop one might
have in one's home or office.85 Then it was easy to distinguish the
act of using software from using other objects, and the information
costs concerning use and transfer of software-embedded goods may
have been effectively segregated from other types of personal
property. By and large, most products that ran software looked
like computers-grey, rectangular desktops or folding laptops.8 6
Just as it is easy to distinguish cars and land from other types of
physical property, computers were easy to distinguish from other
types of objects and appliances as well. Placing restrictions on
how software could be used didn't raise the aggregate information
83 See Rub, supra note 15, at 793 (' The main attribute that makes information costs
significant in the context of copyrighted goods is that those goods are typically cheap and
that they frequently and rapidly change hands. Indeed, information costs are less troubling
the more expensive the product purchased." (footnotes omitted)).
10 See, e.g., id. at 795-816 (considering particular cases of exhaustion in depth).
85 See, e.g., 1998, TIMELINE OF COMPUTER HISTORY, http://www.computerhistory.org/
timeline/1998/ (last visited June 16, 2016) (discussing the introduction of the iMac desktop
computer).
86 See, e.g., 1996, TIMELINE OF COMPUTER HISTORY, http://www.computerhistory.org/
timeline/1996/ (last visited June 16, 2016) (discussing the introduction of the Sony VAIO
desktop computer).
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costs of using and transferring other goods, because it was trivial
to distinguish a computer from a refrigerator.
The ease of identifying computers is quickly diminishing. Now
there are smart thermostats, smart watches, and smart fire
detectors.8 7 Cars run code.88 Wearable devices help quantify one's
exercise and physical habits.89 Most of these devices come with a
corresponding license agreement governing use of the software,
but those licenses sometimes use language that blends any
distinction between the copyrighted software and the physical
device. For example, the June 2014 terms of use for Google Glass
stated, "You may not commercially resell any [Google Glass]
Device, but you may give the Device as a gift, unless otherwise set
forth in [an additional agreement]. ... [t]hese Terms will also
apply to any gift recipient."90 Google Glass's terms attempted to
both limit how transfers of the device can happen, and to bind
future owners of the device to the terms. While a pair of reading
glasses could not generally be burdened this way without violating
the first sale doctrine, the current trajectory of software licensing
law is to accept these types of restrictions on how software and
software-embedded devices can be used and alienated.
As software is incorporated more frequently into personal
property, the information costs associated with using and
transferring personal property will increase. Computers are
1
87 See supra note 1 (discussing the Nest thermostat and smart watches); Dann Albright, 6
Smart Detectors That Protect Your Family and Property from Harm, MAKEUSEOF (June 5,
2015), http://www.makeuseof.com/tag/6-smart-detectors-protect-family-property-harm/.
88 See Robert N. Charette, This Car Runs on Code, IEEE SPECTRUM (Feb. 1 2009, 5:00
GMT), http://spectrum.ieee.org/transportation/systems/this-car-runs-on-code (statement of
Manfred Broy, professor of informatics at Technical University, Munich) ("1f you bought a
premium-class automobile recently, 'it probably contains close to 100 million lines of
software code,' ... ").
89 See, e.g., Nathan Chandler, How FitBit Works, HOWSTUFFWORKS (May 2, 2012), http://
electronics.howstuffworks.com/gadgets/fitness/fitbit.htm ("FitBit is a physical activity
tracker.... FitBit logs a range of data about your activities, including the number of steps
you take, distance traversed and calories burned.").
90 Google Glass Terms of Sale, GOOGLE (June 26, 2014), http://www.googl e.com/glass/ter
msofuse/archive/20140624/.
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getting smaller, cheaper, and faster.91 Because almost anything
can now be designed to run software, the amount of resources a
person must expend to learn how to appropriately use the devices
in their possession will increase, whether the objects in fact run
software or not. If some watches run licensed software to keep
time, the information costs associated with all watches will
increase; 92 even the purchaser of an analog watch will have to
make sure the watch is not digital and subject to a license
agreement. Digital watch owners will need to take the time to
read and understand the lengthy license agreement to determine
what they are not permitted to do with their watches before
beginning use or giving them away.
Both software-embedded goods and patented goods subject to
conditional sales present the same problem: they allow for usage
restrictions to run on chattels, raising the information costs
associated with using not just these software-embedded or
patented goods, but the costs of interacting with all chattels which
may or may not be patented or contain software. As licenses on
chattels become more common, people will come to expect their
presence and be more likely to expend resources learning if a
license exists and understanding its scope. Because distinguishing
among software-embedded goods, patented goods, and other
chattels will not always be easy, the information costs associated
with using and transferring many chattels will rise as well
because individuals will expend greater resources to discover
91 ORG. FOR ECON. Co-OPERATION & DEV., TRENDS SHAPING EDUCATION: 2008 EDITION 56
(2008) ("Information technology has developed very rapidly.., with computers become
smaller, faster, cheaper, and more powerful.").
9 Merrill and Smith have elaborated on how allowing idiosyncratic interests in property
raises the costs of all property investigation:
A and B may have subjective reasons for creating [idiosyncratic] property
rights .... [b]ut, the possible existence of such rights will cause
information costs for others ... to rise. Those considering whether to
purchase property rights... will have more to investigate: They will have
to assure themselves that they are getting all the ... [rights] that they
want. Furthermore, they will have to worry about dimensions of division
and elaboration that perhaps no one has yet thought of, making the
acquisition of any ... [similar piece of property] more uncertain as well as
riskier.
Merrill & Smith, supra note 7, at 32 (footnotes omitted).
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whether "regular" pieces of personal property are subject to usage
restrictions.
One appealing resolution is fairly straightforward: to rein in the
flexibility that software license agreements have been given and
bring software-embedded products back into the legal world
inhabited by their non-patented and non-digital counterparts.
Brian Carver, Aaron Perzanowski and Jason Schultz point to an
existing section of the copyright statute that could limit when
idiosyncratic usage restrictions may apply.93 Section 106(3) grants
copyright holders the exclusive right "to distribute copies or
phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other
transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending."94 This
language suggests that an authorized distribution of a copyrighted
work, such as a piece of software, must either transfer ownership
of the copy of the software, or more temporary rights.95 Carver
concludes that transfer of perpetual possession should be "the key
factor" in determining when transfer of the title to a copy has
taken place.96 Perzanowski and Schultz reach a similar opinion,
arguing that courts should consider three factors when
determining whether a transfer is a sale: whether the duration of
consumer possession or access is perpetual, whether access is
contingent on a one-time payment or ongoing payments, and
whether the transaction is characterized as a sale or purchase. 97
Perzanowski and Schultz acknowledge that there will be grey-area
cases but anticipate that courts will be able to draw appropriate
distinctions. 98
Carver, Perzanowski and Schultz's position that perpetual
possession of a copy should often render it sold has the potential to
93 Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Reconciling Intellectual and Personal Property,
90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1211, 1251-52 (2015); Brian W. Carver, Why License Agreements
Do Not Control Copy Ownership: First Sales and Essential Copies, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1887, 1945-46 (2010).
)4 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2012).
95 Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 93, at 1252; Carver, supra note 93, at 1945-46
96 Carver, supra note 93, at 1954.
97 Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 93, at 1256.
I98 See id. at 1258 (explaining that if the factors were applied consistently, it would allow
consumers to understand what they are buying and what they can do with it and it would
allow rightsholders to structure transactions to avoid exhaustion).
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work well in the context of the Internet of Things, particularly
because treating software tied to a particular device as sold would
be less likely to trigger many intellectual property owners'
concerns over loss of control of their works. Copyrighted software
is intricately tied to the corresponding device; the program that
runs a toaster, for example, would be of little value on a general
purpose computer. As a result, concerns about end-users making
multiple copies or facilitating piracy are less worrisome. The
combined package of a smart toaster's software and chassis
constitutes a rivalrous, scarce resource, just like any other piece of
personal property. When the information costs associated with
using it are low, society benefits from the ease with which it can be
used to serve different purposes for different people.
This is only one of several possible suggestions for how to
minimize information costs associated with transfer of networked
and software-embedded goods. But regardless of how the law in
this area evolves, it is important to acknowledge that the
information costs associated with transfer of intellectual-property-
embedded objects are driven up for the same reasons, and likely at
the same rate, as they are for personal property generally.
B. OTHER COPYRIGHTED WORKS
Courts have been exceptionally willing to enforce software
licenses, while simultaneously holding unenforceable attempts to
license other types of copyrighted works. Nonetheless, copyright
owners who would presently benefit from greater control of their
works, and who lack the incentives to worry about third-party
information costs, have also been working to expand the end-user
license agreement phenomenon to non-software and non-digital
works as well. Currently, a popular home-workout DVD seller,
Beachbody, insists that the DVDs it sells to customers are
licensed, not sold, and threatens to sue those who try to resell its
DVDs on eBay.99 Regardless of whether Beachbody's suits would
9 See id. at 1236-37 (discussing Beachbody LLC's terms of use); Beachbody and Team
Beachbody Terms and Conditions of Use for Residents of the United States, BEACHBODY (Feb.
10, 2016), http://www.beachbody.com/product/about-us/terms of use.do ("For any Beachbody
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prevail in court, Amazon appears to have indulged the company by
eliminating the option to buy "used" versions of the Beachbody
DVDs from its site.100  Other companies' exercise DVDs are
generally available used.101
Recently, the Ninth Circuit considered two cases which together
suggest "software exceptionalism"10 2 is still the rule when it comes
to licensing copies of copyright works. UMG Recordings v.
Augusto'0 3 involved promotional music CDs that had originally
been sent to music critics and disc jockeys. 10 4 Each CD had been
marked with notice specifying that the CD was for promotional use
only and was not transferable to parties other than the intended
recipient. 10 5 The defendant, Augusto, acquired the CDs from
Services which enable you to use any.., any... content... owned or licensed by us... we
grant you a limited, revocable, non-exclusive, non-sublicensable, non-transferable license to
access the use of the specific Beachbody Services ... for your personal, non-commercial use
only." (emphasis omitted)).
100 See, e.g., FOCUS T25 Shaun T's NEW Workout DVD Program - Get It Done in 25
Minutes, AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/Shaun-FOCUS-T25-Base-Kit/dp/B0ODDBS2JE/ref
=sr 1 l?s-sporting-goods&ie=UTF8&qid=1404239886&sr-1 (last visited June 17, 2016)
(selling Beachbody product, but lacking option to buy used versions). The absence of used
DVD sales has caused some confusion among Amazon customers and potential resellers. See,
e.g., Does Amazon No Longer Allow Reselling Newer Beachbody DVDs?, VIDEOFITNESS.COM,
http://www.videofitness.com/-vfwnk/forum/showthread.php?t=197848 (last visited June 17,
2016); Thread: Why Can't I List Insanity 60-day Exercise DVD Set?, AMAZON SERVICES, https://
sellercentral.amazon.com/forums/message.jspa?messageID=843863 (last visited June 17,
2016) (inquiring on Amazon seller forum why seller cannot list a used Beachbody DVD set for
sale).
101 See, e.g., Jillian Michaels - 30 Day Shred, AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/Jillian-Mich
aels-30-Day-Shred/dp/BO0127RAJY/ref=-sr 1 11?s=movies-tv&ie=UTF8&qid=1404240066&sr
=1-11&keywords=exercise (last visited June 17, 2016) (showing several used DVD copies
available for sale); Zumba Fitness Total Body Transformation DVD Set, AMAZON, http://www.
amazon.com/Zumba-Fitness-Total-Transformation-System/dp/BO02HZ4XMC/ref=sr 1 26?s=
movies-tv&ie=UTF8&qid=1404240095&sr=l-26&keywords=exercise (last visited June 17,
2016) (same).
102 See Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 93, at 1216 (defining software exceptionalism
as "the notion that for a variety of reasons software should be treated differently").
103 628 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2011).
104 Id. at 1177.
105 Some CDs stated,
This CD is the property of the record company and is licensed to the
intended recipient for personal use only. Acceptance of this CD shall
constitute an agreement to comply with the terms of the license. Resale or
transfer of possession is not allowed and may be punishable under federal
and state laws.
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various sources and then resold them on eBay. 10 6 UMG sued him
on the theory that the CDs had been licensed, not sold, and that
Augusto didn't own or have the right to transfer the CDs. 10 7 The
Ninth Circuit held that UMG hadn't created a licensing agreement
by sending the CDs affixed with notice to recipients and that the
CD recipients had gained title to the CDs.108
The same panel of judges 0 9 that decided UMG v. Augusto also
decided the software distribution case, Vernor v. Autodesk. 110
Similar to the facts in Augusto, Vernor resold on eBay CDs
containing software which had purportedly been licensed.'11 The
Court concluded that Vernor did not have the right to sell the CDs
by looking to the Ninth Circuit's three-part test for determining
whether software had been licensed or sold: first, "whether the
copyright owner specifies that a user is granted a license"; second,
"whether the copyright owner significantly restricts the user's
ability to transfer the software"; and third, "whether the copyright
owner imposes notable use restrictions" on the work.11 2
The holdings of Vernor and Augusto are difficult to reconcile.
The most straightforward explanation for their opposite holdings
is "software exceptionalism"-the notion that for some reason,
licensing software is more acceptable than licensing copies of other
works. 113 In Vernor, the Ninth Circuit explicitly uses a test that is
specific to software. 114 In Augusto, it notes that "[p]articularly
with regard to computer software, we have recognized that
copyright owners may create licensing arrangements... ,"115
Id. at 1177-78. Others simply were marked, "Promotional Use Only-Not for Sale." Id. at
1178.
106 Id. at 1178.
107 Id. at 1177.
108 Id. at 1182.
109 Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 93, at 1227.
110 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010).
M Id. at 1103.
112 Id. at 1111.
113 See Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 93, at 1227-31 ("'T]he rules that govern
ownership of other copies and chattels generally.., do not apply to the thoroughly modern
stuff that is computer software.").
114 621 F.3d at 1111.
115 Augusto, 628 F.3d at 1180 (emphasis added).
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On the other hand, it is not necessarily true that the only
plausible explanation for the holdings in Augusto and Vernor is
that software may be easily licensed but other copyrighted works
may not. The language of Augusto also suggests that a reason the
first sale doctrine applies is because the initial recipients of the
CDs did nothing to assent to the license. The court writes, for
instance, "[olur conclusion that the recipients acquired ownership
of the CDs is based largely on the nature of UMG's distribution."' 116
UMG's original CD recipients were never in a position to decide
whether to acquire the CDs with restrictions or not; the CDs
simply showed up in their mail.117 It's not certain that the Ninth
Circuit would have come to the same result if the CDs were
initially acquired in another manner. Although the factors that
determine whether software has been licensed or sold, which were
applied in Vernor, do not at all consider the actions of the software
purchaser or recipient, one wonders if there is not an unstated,
fourth factor in the test, under which the initial receiver of the
software must take some action concerning or acknowledging the
license agreement.118
However one reads Augusto and Vernor, it remains the case
that courts are comparatively more comfortable enforcing licenses
that apply to a digital environment rather than a physical. But
commentators are beginning to point out that the licensing
phenomenon as it has developed does not quite fit with existing
property or contract jurisprudence. Mark Patterson has noted
that courts frequently bend contract law beyond recognition to find
"acceptance" in software licensing agreements, which would not
suffice in other contexts. 119 Brian Carver describes attempts to
116 Id.
117 Id. at 1177.
118 Cf. Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1178-79 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that
"where a website makes its terms of use available via a conspicuous hyperlink on every page of
the website but otherwise provides no notice to users nor prompts them to take any
affirmative action to demonstrate assent, even close proximity of the hyperlink to relevant
buttons users must click on-without more-is insufficient to give rise to constructive notice").
119 Mark R. Patterson, Must Licenses Be Contracts? Consent and Notice in Intellectual
Property, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 105, 114 (2012) ("The Federal Circuit and courts following it
have suggested that ... the post-sale notice can create a contractual license restriction. To
reach this result, the courts distort contract law beyond recognition." (footnotes omitted)).
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transfer "perpetual possession of a copy [while] retaining title to
the copy" as "incoherent and not found in the Copyright Act."1 20
Christopher Newman argues that licenses are fundamentally
creatures of property, and that conceptualizing them only as
contracts often produces highly undesirable results.1 21 From a
different perspective, B.J. Ard argues that the fusion of supra-
compensatory copyright damages with the idiosyncrasy of contract
terms raises problems of fairness and notice. 122
The inchoate status of licensing law creates the opportunity for
change in many directions. This change can be positive and move
in a direction that reduces the information costs associated with
using protected works. Or, the change can be negative and create
the opportunity for more variation in licensing and higher
information costs for transactions within physical and intellectual
property law. Just as with chattels that run software, permitting
restrictive licensure of permanently-acquired goods has the
potential to significantly raise the information costs associated
with using and transferring personal property. Courts and private
intermediaries should be reluctant to enforce or respect these
attempts without considering the effects they have on property
sale transaction costs as a whole.
C. DIGITAL GOODS AND DISEMBODIED SOFTWARE
Keeping the permissible property interests of software-
embedded chattels aligned with other types of personal property
makes sense from an information cost perspective. And because
the software is inextricably connected to a particular, specialized
device, one can see how a system governing "smart devices" will
120 See Carver, supra note 93, at 1954 ('Courts... [focus] on the wrong factors for
determining ownership of the copy, unless they stay focused on the right of perpetual
possession.').
121 See Christopher M. Newman, A License Is Not a "Contract Not To Sue" Disentangling
Property and Contract in the Law of Copyright Licenses, 98 IOwA L. REV. 1101, 1109-10
(2013) ("The concept of license, I argue, belongs fundamentally to property, not contract.");
see also id. at 1103-05 (providing examples of where viewing a license as a "contract not to
sue" a licensee would produce undesirable results).
122 See generally B.J. Ard, Notice and Remedies in Copyright Licensing, 80 MO. L. REV. 313
(2015).
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tend to work similarly to how personal property transfers have
historically functioned.
A more complicated question is how to develop a sensible way to
govern the transfer of disembodied digital works-software that
runs on a general-purpose computer, including digital media such
as ebooks, music and video files. Even if one eliminated the
holding of MA! Systems, the core differences between physical and
digital goods demand a more nuanced answer to the question of
how digital objects should be treated under the law. Whereas
previously, one might take a CD out of one's home entertainment
system to use in a portable player or to lend to a friend, now
moving an mp3 from a desktop to an mp3 player or to a friend's
computer requires making a copy.123 Courts have entertained the
idea that digital works may be transferred when the device they
are on is transferred as well, because no new copy is made in the
process. 124 But the reality of how people use computers makes this
an inapposite answer to the general question of whether
copyrighted digital works can be sold or transferred. In the
absence of appealing alternatives, courts look to license
agreements to determine what rights an end-user has over a
digital work. But just as with personal property, use restrictions
on digital works have the potential to create problematically high
information costs.
Previously, this author has suggested that licenses to digital
works should be required to grant a minimum of a transferable
personal use right to licensees. 125 Many others have argued that
something akin to a digital first sale doctrine would generally be
123 See Mitch Bartlett, Galaxy S6: Transfer Music Files from PC, TECHNIPAGES (Apr. 11,
2015), http://www.technipages.com/galaxy-s6-transfer-music-files-from-pc (explaining how
to transfer music from one device to another and using the word "copy" to describe the
transferral process).
124 See Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDIGI Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 656 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
("Section 109(a) still protects a lawful owner's sale of her 'particular' phonorecord, be it a
computer hard disk, iPod, or other memory device onto which the file was originally
downloaded. While this limitation clearly presents obstacles to resale that are different
from, and perhaps even more onerous than, those involved in the resale of CDs and
cassettes, the limitation is hardly absurd . .
125 See Mulligan, supra note 15, at 275-82.
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beneficial. 126  The company ReDIGI attempted to create an
experience analogous to reselling physical copies of works by
designing a system that "resold" a digital work by sending the
buyer a copy while deleting the seller's. 127 However, courts have
not yet embraced ReDIGI's notion of digital resale. 128
But while the status quo may seem overly restrictive of digital
resale, some copyright holders fear that a "strong" digital first sale
doctrine would create difficulties for copyright owners trying to
extract payment from their works by making lending "too"
efficient.129 Whenever someone was not actively using a file, a
robust first sale doctrine would permit it to be rented out or resold.
Hundreds of people would be able to share the same incarnation of
a work, so long as only one person was using it at a time.
Many would see the phenomenon of making more efficient
libraries as socially beneficial, but copyright holders who worry
such lending would prevent sufficient monetization of their works
would prefer permitting restrictive licensure for digital works
instead. It may be that information costs associated with digital
126 See Justin Graham, Preserving the Aftermarket in Copyrighted Works: Adapting the
First Sale Doctrine to the Emerging Technological Landscape, 2002 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1,
86 ("[A] strong first sale doctrine is necessary to preserve a free and robust aftermarket in
copyrighted material."); Katz, supra note 33, at 133-41; Henry Sprott Long III,
Reconsidering the "Balance" of the "Digital First Sale" Debate: Re-Examining the Case for a
Statutory Digital First Sale Doctrine to Facilitate Second-Hand Digital Media Markets, 59
ALA. L. REV. 1183, 1185 (2008) ("[Ihe need for a durable digital first sale doctrine is ever
more apparent...."); Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Digital Exhaustion, 58 UCLA L.
REV. 889, 889 (2011) ("[C]ourts have ample room to apply and continue to develop common
law rules that preserve the many benefits of the first sale doctrine in the digital
marketplace."); R. Anthony Reese, The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks, 44
B.C. L. REv. 577, 577 (2003) ("The article focuses on the affordability and availability effects
of the [first sale] doctrine.').
127 See ReDIGI Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d at 645-46 ("[U]sers... [can] sell their legally
acquired digital music files, and buy used digital music from others at a fraction of the price
currently available on iTunes."); see also REDIGI, https://www.redigi.co/ (last visited June
17, 2016) (stating that "ReDIGI is heading to appeal").
128 ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d at 644.
129 See Jeff Roberts, Should You Have a Right to Sell Your eBooks and Digital Music?,
GIGAOM (June 6, 2014, 5:39 AM), https://gigaom.com/2014/06/06/should-you-have-a-right-to-
sell-your-ebooks-and-digital- music/ ("Copyright owners, wary of how easy it is to copy and
share works online, have found a way to make sure that no one technically buys a book,
music album or video in the first place... This means that there is no 'sale' in the legal
sense of the word, and so the first sale rule doesn't apply.").
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works would increase with licensure, but that it wouldn't matter
much given the low marginal cost of copyright owners creating
new digital copies. In other words, there may be little need to
create ideal rules for allocating resources in the absence of
scarcity. But despite the ease with which digital files can be
copied, over time, even digital works become scarce when
copyright owners cease to make them available and files degrade
or are destroyed.130
Looking at property law and the law of how resources are
allocated through an information cost lens helps one think about
these challenges but does not yield a single solution. Property law
makes an imperfect, rough cut at how resources may be allocated,
sacrificing the ideal world for estimates which are good enough,
towards the end of keeping information costs low enough that
property allocation and use stays manageable. 131 There is, then,
potentially more than one "good enough" way to delineate rights in
disembodied digital objects. Trying to explore each possible way
would take this Article on a long tangent. However, the values of
keeping information costs low and facilitating the ongoing use of
digital works should play a significant role in determining what
those rights or structures should be.
IV. SOCIAL COSTS
The content of standard property forms and what rights the
government will recognize is a choice that can reflect a variety of
social values, as well as impact information costs.18 2 Hanoch
Dagan argues that the forms of property offer "a tentative
suggestion to parse the social world into distinct categories of
human interaction. '"13 3 Joseph Singer writes that the existing
system of estates in land reflects the "values that shape the
130 See Reese, supra note 126, at 592-610, 630-44 (discussing scenarios in which copyright
owners can cease to make their works available).
131 See Smith, supra note 47, at 1704 ('The architecture of property emerges from the
process of solving the problem of how to serve use interests in a roughly cost-effective way.").
132 See generally Nestor M. Davidson, Standardization and Pluralism in Property Law, 61
VAND. L. REv. 1597 (2008).
13 Dagan, supra note 17, at 1559.
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contours of the social relationships in a free and democratic
society."'134  In short, the choices of how and how much to
standardize property can and do speak to values besides economic
efficiency. For example, permitting flexible licenses for the
Internet of Things may encourage greater surveillance and remote
control of networked objects in order to ease enforcement of the
license restrictions. To the extent that surveillance and remote
control harms users' privacy and autonomy interests, legal
institutions may want to restrict flexible licenses in order to
decrease the prevalence of socially undesirable side-effects.
Flexible licensure may encourage manufacturers to build self-
monitoring products in order to decrease the information costs
associated with the products' usage, employing bar code scanners,
radio frequency identification (RFID) tags, 13 5  digital rights
management (DRM) software, 13 6 and a host of other tools. Whereas
humans once bore the full burden of figuring out what they could do
with their property, new technologies may be able to lower and
absorb those costs. But the prospect of lowering information costs
requires greater surveillance of everyday life and home life, of how
and where one uses objects, as well as who uses them. While
technology may be able to decrease information costs so as to
economically allow for the encumbrance of chattels, these and other
social costs arise in the place of those information costs saved.
The problem of high information costs stems from the fact that
humans bear the costs of compliance. Just as humans read and
implement the text of wills specifying complicated inheritance
rules, humans also bear the obligation of reading the dozen or
more pages of EULAs and ToS and confining their behavior to that
134 Singer, supra note 17, at 1050.
135 See What is RFD?, TECHNOVELGY.COM, http://www.technovelgy.comlct/technology-art
icle.asp (last visited June 18, 2016) (defining RFID as "small electronic devices that consist
of a small chip and an antenna," which "serves the same purpose as a bar code or a
magnetic strip" by "provid[ing] a unique identifier for that object").
136 See What is DRM?, DEFECTIVEBYDESIGN.ORG, https://www.defectivebydesign.org/what
is drm digital restrictionsmanagement (last visited June 18, 2016) (defining DRM as
"the practice of imposing technological restrictions that control what users can do with
digital media").
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which is permitted by the license. '37 But to varying degrees,
technology may make it feasible to keep track of how objects are
used or simply prevent a forbidden action from being taken
entirely. For software-embedded goods, the product would refuse
to function in a disallowed way. Other articles of tangible property
could be tagged with an RFID chip or unique serial number.
When certain events occurred, such as transferring ownership or
relocating a chattel, the article could be scanned and a separate
computer could analyze whether the proposed use or transfer were
permitted.
These hypotheticals are less far-fetched than they first appear.
In 2012, Microsoft filed for a patent titled "Content Distribution
Regulation by Viewing User."138 The patent envisioned a system
where someone would, for example, purchase a license for a
certain number of viewers to watch a movie through the Xbox 360
system. 139 The Xbox 360 Kinect, which is equipped with a camera,
would then continuously monitor whether more people than
137 One major justification for refusing to enforce complex property interests or restrictive
license agreements would be that, in the aggregate, they could not all be read and
comprehended in a practical amount of time. Economists have estimated that individuals who
read every privacy policy to which they agreed online would each spend about 244 hours per
year, or 40 minutes a day, reading policies. Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The
Cost of Reading Privacy Policies, 4 11S: J.L. & POL'Y FOR INFO. SOC'Y 543, 564 (2008); see also
Dan L. Burk, DNA Rules: Legal and Conceptual Implications of Biological 'Lock-Out"
Systems, 92 CALIF. L. REv. 1553, 1584 (2004) ('The inability of the general public to track all
the myriad permutations of mass market license is well illustrated by the frequent appearance
of outrageous terms in such contracts... including provisions that forbid criticism of the
product or... conferring... upon the publisher of web page design software a right in the web
pages designed using the software purchased.'). Lengthy licenses for software would similarly
take an inordinate and unrealistic amount of time to read, particularly as the number of
software-embedded goods increases. Even Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts admits
he does not read EULAs. Mike Masnick, Supreme Court Chief Justice Admits He Doesn't
Read Online EULAs Or Other "Fine Print,'TECHDIRT (Oct. 22, 2010, 9:48 AM), http://www.tec
hdirt.com/articles/20101021/02145811519/supreme-court-chief-justice-admits-he-doesn-t-read-
online-eulas-or-other-fine-print.shtml; Debra Cassens Weiss, Chief Justice Roberts Admits He
Doesn't Read the Computer Fine Print, ABA J. (Oct. 20, 2010, 12:17 PM), http://www.abajourn
al.comlnews/article/chiefjustice robertsadmits he doesnt read the-computer fine-print/.
138 U.S. Patent Application No. 20,120,278,904 (filed Nov. 1, 2012); Tim Cushing,
Microsoft Patents TV That Watches Back, Counts Heads, Charges Admission, TECHDIRT
(Nov. 9, 2012, 11:45 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20121105/21564420943/microso
ft-patents-tv-that-watches-back-counts-heads-charges-admission.shtml.
139 '904 Patent Application, claim 27.
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licensed were watching the film by counting the number of people
in the room. 140 The '904 Patent Application explained, "if the
number of user-views licensed is exceeded, remedial action may be
taken."'' Few products are more Orwellian than a television that
watches you back. But the Microsoft '904 Patent Application is
only the tip of the iceberg. Some cars are also being outfitted to
include engine "shut-off devices," which automatically stop cars
from running when car payments are late. 142 These devices
communicate wirelessly to lenders or dealers. When a payment is
late, the device warns the customer that a deadline is imminent
and shuts off the car several days after a payment is due and
missed.143 The cars also include global positioning system (GPS)
devices that can locate the car remotely, "to speed up the
repossession of the vehicle, if necessary."'144 More positively for car
owners, these types of devices can also be used to locate and shut
down cars when they are stolen. 145
The Microsoft '904 Patent Application and engine shut-off
devices highlight two key values that would be undermined by
encoding DRM on or tagging-and-tracking everything: allowing for
unanticipated, necessary uses of property, and protecting privacy.
Both are explored in the following section, along with concerns
about the effectiveness of using DRM to automatically enforce
usage restrictions on chattels.
A. NECESSITY AND EFFICIENT BREACH
Under the common law, one could invoke "necessity" as a
defense to claims of trespass or conversion. In the case of public
necessity, one has the privilege to trespass or convert chattels "if
the act is or is reasonably believed to be necessary for the purpose
140 Cushing, supra note 138; '904 Patent Application, claims 8-9.
141 '904 Patent Application, abstract.
142 Gary Hoffman, Pay Up or Your Car Engine Will Stop, CNN.COM (Apr. 17, 2009), http://
edition.cnn.com/2009/LMNG/wayoflife/04/17/aa.bills.shut.engine.down/index.html.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id.
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of avoiding a public disaster."146 One may also invoke a similar
defense when private welfare is at risk--"if it is or is reasonably
believed to be reasonable and necessary to protect the person or
property of the actor, the other or a third person from serious
harm .. -147 When relying on a private necessity defense to
protect anyone besides the relevant chattels' owner, the actor is
liable for any harm caused, but not for nominal or punitive
damages.148 Variations on the necessity defense also appear in
numerous states' laws and in the Model Penal Code. 149 The Model
Penal Code provision is aptly titled "Choice of Evils" and provides
that "[c]onduct that the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a
harm or evil to himself or to another is justifiable, provided
that.., the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is
greater than that sought to be prevented by the law defining the
offense charged," among other requirements. 150
Regardless of the precise contours of the necessity defense in
civil and criminal scenarios, the purpose of these exceptions to
generally applicable regulations of conduct is plain. Although
individuals are likely to disagree about exactly under what
circumstances law-breaking is "the lesser evil," most would agree
that there are circumstances where it is preferable, or even
morally requisite, to break a law in order to avoid a harmful
result. 151 Adding DRM to real-world objects, such as cars,
weapons, or computers in order to enforce ownership rights risks
making rights-infringing, but necessary, decisions impossible.
Hypotheticals are not difficult to spin out. One may need to drive
146 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 262 (1965); see also id. § 196 (describing a defense
of public necessity for trespass to land).
147 Id. § 263(1); see also id. § 197 (describing a defense of private necessity for trespass to
land).
148 Id. § 263(2); id. § 263 cmt. e (creating liability for only actual damages).
14.9 See George C. Christie, The Defense of Necessity Considered from the Legal and Moral
Points of View, 48 DUKE L.J. 975, 1025-31 (1999) (describing the defense under the Model
Penal Code).
150 Model Penal Code § 3.02(1) (1981).
151 Discussing when precisely such law violations are and are not justified would go far
beyond the scope of this paper, but works that engage in discussions of the topic include
Christie, supra note 149, at 1026; JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 282 (1992).
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a car to avert an emergency, or need to alter a thermostat when
the weather takes an unexpected, freezing turn.
Still other license violations do not implicate avoiding bodily
harm but simply evoke the contract-law notion of efficient
breach. 152  For example, maybe one simply needs to borrow
another's Google Glass or smart watch at the last minute, in order
to access certain information while engaging in a contentious
business meeting. The borrower of the glasses or watch would be
happy to pay for the entire product but simply did not have the
opportunity to acquire one before she needed it. So she borrows
another person's in violation of the license agreement. This is a
case where actual damages to the licensor are virtually
nonexistent, but the benefits to the borrower may be enormous.
On balance, allowing parties to breach the license seems
preferable to simply preventing the article from functioning ex
ante. And if these licenses sound implausible, consider that the
license for Microsoft Office: Home & Student Edition nominally
forbids houseguests from sitting down at one's computer and using
Word or Excel. 153
Although the threshold at which violating licenses and
servitudes become appealing will change based on the remedies
available to a harmed party, the "end-user," or the person in
possession of the chattel, should have the power to decide how to
use it to a given situation. That the choice of how to use a chattel
remains with its possessor, instead of a licensor who drafted rules
about how it can be used months or years before, is valuable
because the current possessor will have far better information
about whatever situation she is in than the license drafter did. In
effect, the relationship between a license drafter and end-user is
somewhat analogous to the relationship between a central
152 See Barry E. Adler, Efficient Breach Theory Through the Looking Glass, 83 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1679, 1680-81 (2008) (defining efficient breach).
153 See Microsoft Software License Terms (MSLT) for Microsoft Office 2010 § 1(12),
MIcRosoFr.coM, https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/confirmation.aspx?id=13653 (last
visited June 18, 2016) ("For software marked 'Home and Student' edition, you may install one
copy of the software on up to three licensed devices in your household for use by people for
whom that is their primary residence.").
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economic planner and an individual. 154 A common argument
against extensive centralized planning is that a small group of
planners cannot realistically gather and process enough
information to anticipate the situations and needs of the hundreds
of thousands of individuals who will be affected by their
decisions. 55 As a result, trying to anticipate exactly how many
cars, chairs, coffee beans, and cherry pies to make available at any
given place at any given time becomes an impossible task because
of the number of variables that must be taken into account.
The licensor faces the same problem as the central planner, but
lacks the incentives to try to reach an optimal result. While a
central planner's stated goal is to justly and effectively allocate
resources to the public, the licensor drafting a EULA writes with
the manufacturer's or distributor's best interests in mind, not the
end-user's.15 6 The licensor will typically not care if a chattel
occasionally will not let its possessor use it in a way that is very
valuable to the possessor. The market will have some tempering
effect on the strictness of these limitations if they are frequently a
cause of frustration. But so long as the chattel does not stop
working often, there likely will not be enough market pressure to
alter how a particular device is permitted to function.
B. PRIVACY
Even assuming software can be written that correctly assesses
whether a chattel's use or transfer is authorized, and which allows
for unauthorized uses when necessary or efficient, outsourcing the
information costs associated with authorized property uses will
create concerns about privacy. Any system trying to answer the
question of who can use what, when, where, and under what
154 Cf. F.A Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 524 (1945)
("We need decentralization because only thus can we ensure that the knowledge of the
particular circumstances of time and place will be promptly used.').
' Id. at 519-20.
156 Cf. Katz, supra note 33, at 115 ("User innovation.., implies that knowing who is best
able to maximize the value of an asset at the time of transaction is unlikely.... [J]f we
cannot tell ex ante who is in the best position to further innovate, rules allowing possessors
of goods to innovate without restraints reduce transaction costs.").
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circumstances will have to know where the object in question is,
who is using it or to whom it is being transferred, and other details
depending on how restrictions are designed.
Much has been written about the harms, real and potential, of
massive data collection by private companies of personal
information. Belief that the government reads individuals'
internet search queries has been shown to chill the content of
searches one does. 157  The notion that one's uses of various
products are also being recorded by private parties would
reasonably be expected to have similar effects. Moreover, losing
privacy has the potential to impact many other aspects of one's life
and personal development. Among other values, privacy promotes
"autonomy, self-fulfillment, socialization, and.., freedom from the
abuse of power."158 Julie Cohen makes the case that privacy "is an
indispensable structural feature" of our political systems and that
freedom from surveillance is "foundational to the capacity for
innovation" and self-development. 159 Neil Richards warns that
"surveillance of people when they are thinking, reading, and
communicating with others .... is especially dangerous because it
can cause people not to experiment with new, controversial, or
deviant ideas."160  These negative effects of loss of privacy exist
even when someone has "nothing to hide."1 61 Moreover, massive
data collection on individuals presents the possibility that dossiers
on individuals will be used in discriminatory or other objectionable
ways. 162
157 Alex Marthews & Catherine E. Tucker, Government Surveillance and Internet Search
Behavior 27 (Apr. 29, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.comabstract=2412564.
158 Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, Obscurity: A Better Way to Think About Your Data
Than 'Privacy,'ATLANTIC (Jan. 17, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/20
13/01/obscurity-a-better-way-to-think-about-your-data-than-privacy/267283/.
159 Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1905 (2013).
160 Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1935 (2013).
161 See generally DANIEL J. SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE: THE FALSE TRADEOFF BETWEEN
PRIVACY AND SECURITY (2011) (criticizing the argument that privacy is not necessary when
one has "nothing to hide").
162 See Peppet, supra note 2, at 117-33 (discussing the problems that the massive data
collection relating to the Internet of Things will bring about); Richards, supra note 160, at
1952-58 (discussing the harms of surveillance). The further difficulty of correcting errors in
individuals' dossiers has the potential to lead to Kafkaesque absurdity when one cannot see
or alter the system that has led to one's being characterized a particular way. See DANIEL
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Admittedly, self-monitoring products are a largely legal exercise
in self-help by companies. Even in the absence of personal
property servitudes or restrictive licenses, nothing currently
prevents companies from making products which monitor and
store sensitive data about users. 168  Yet, suggesting massive
private surveillance as an alternative to property standardization
will likely encourage further privacy intrusions which the benefits
of property flexibility may not justify.
C. INEFFECTIVENESS
A final concern is that technology designed to govern transfer
and use restrictions will not work effectively. DRM technology
provides an example of how automated use and transfer
restrictions can harm even well-intentioned users. Using DRM,
software programs or digital content can be designed to only run
with the proper password or other permission, or to only work for a
fixed amount of time or for a certain number of uses.164 But the
failures of DRM are legion, particularly when the technology fails
on its own terms and blocks people from accessing content they
have a license to access. For example, several software companies
have experimented with requiring computers running the software
to always be connected to the internet by writing their software to
continually "check in" with the companies' servers to establish that
the software has been paid for. 16 5 Failures of these systems,
J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 27-
54 (2006).
163 See Peppet, supra note 2, at 89-90 (describing how the privacy policy for the
Breathometer provides that "blood-alcohol test results are being stored indefinitely in the
cloud, cannot be deleted by the user, may be disclosed in a court proceeding if necessary,
and may be used to tailor advertisements at the company's discretion").
164 Q&A- What is DRM?, BBC NEWS (Apr. 2, 2007, 2:13 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 2/hi/te
chnology/6337781.stm.
165 For example, in 2010, the gaming company Ubisoft decided to set up its games so that the
program would have to check in with Ubisoft over the internet before a user could play. If the
player had a poor internet connection or had been kicked offline, the game would abort after
failing to reach the company. Ben Kuchera, Ubisoft's New DRM Solution: You Have Be Online
to Play, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 27, 2010, 4:11 PM), http://arstechnica.com/gaming/news/2010/01/
ubisofts-new-drm-solution-you-have-be-online-to-play.ars; Mike Masnick, Ubisoft DRM Gets
Worse And Worse: Kicks You Out of Game If You Have a Flakey WiFi Connection, TECHDIRT
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resulting in users being blocked from accessing the material for
which they already paid, have inadvertently created incentives for
users to make and find unauthorized, infringing copies of the
software or content, stripped of the DRM. 16 6 Even when DRM
works, it is often designed to prevent people from using the
material in legal ways, such as making fair uses or other excepted
reproductions under the Copyright Act.167 Because the boundary
between a fair use and an infringing use is not precisely defined
and is indeed the frequent subject of hotly contested lawsuits, a
well-meaning designer of DRM would be unable to include an
exception for fair use because he could not encode a "judge on a
chip."168 While a protection measure could be designed to yield
(Feb. 18, 2010, 5:46 PM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20100218/1514238229.html; Chris
Pereira, Assassin's Creed 2 on PC Requires a Constant Internet Connection, 1UP.COM (Feb. 17,
2010), http://www.lup.com/news/assassin-creed-2-requires-constant. At one point, Ubisoft's
servers crashed, preventing anyone from playing its Assassin's Creed 2 game. Mike Masnick,
Ubisoft's "You Must Be Connected To This Server' Annoying DRM Servers Go Down, TECHDIRT
(Mar. 8, 2010, 6:12 AM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20100308/0138388459.html; Griffin
McElroy, Ubisoft DRM Authentication Server Is Down, Assassin's Creed 2 Unplayable,
ENGADGET (Mar. 7, 2010), http://www.joystiq.com/2010/03/07/ubisoft-drm-authentification-ser
ver-is-down-assassins-creed-2. Problems with DRM technology have extended into other areas
as well. The DRM on Blu-Ray copies of Avatar prevented many who purchased the film from
watching it on their Blu-Ray players. Karl Bode, Avatar Blu-Ray Customers Not Enjoying
Their DRM-Crippled Discs, TECHDIRT (Apr. 27, 2010, 12:32 AM), http://www.techdirt.comlarti
cles/20100423/1012179155.html. At another time, a Blu-Ray firmware update temporarily
rendered Warner Brothers and Universal films unwatchable. Richard Lawler, Samsung Blu-
ray Players Won't Play Warner, Universal Movies After Firmware Update, Require a Rollback,
ENGADGET (Aug. 22, 2010), http://www.engadget.com/2010/08/22/samsung-blu-ray-players-wo
nt-play-warner-universal-movies-afte/; Mike Masnick, DRM Strikes Again: Samsung Blu-ray
Firmware Update Means No Warner or Universal Movies, TECHDIRT (Aug. 23, 2010, 1:48 PM),
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20100823/05113410739.html.
166 For example, Ubisoft's system was "cracked" almost as soon as it was made available.
Mike Masnick, Ubisoft's Annoying New DRM Cracked Within Hours of Release, TECHDIRT
(Mar. 4, 2010, 7:59 PM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20100304/1302148421.html
Masnick noted: "Many people... [said] that while they would have bought the game
otherwise, now they would just wait for a DRM-free cracked version to show up." Id.
167 See Timothy K. Armstrong, Digital Rights Management and the Process of Fair Use, 20
HARv. J.L. TECH. 49, 50 (2006) (explaining how copyright holders may deploy DRM
mechanisms that preclude consumers' lawful fair use of digital copyrighted works and
proposing an alternative framework for protecting fair use in digital copyright).
168 See C.J. Alice Chen & Aaron Burnstein, Foreword to Symposium: The Law &
Technology of Digital Rights Management, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 487, 491 (2003) ("Unless
DRM systems include a 'judge on a chip,' they will remain incapable of determining whether
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access to any user who simply claims to have a legal reason to
access it, this would undermine the goal of having an automated
process (rather than a person) bear the information costs
surrounding usage.
Nonetheless, while DRM is reasonably effective at controlling
certain kinds of uses, it has limits. A digital camera's license, for
example, may prevent lending the camera to another. 169 Most
DRM we encounter cannot act to prevent this. Maybe a camera
could require a password to work, but the owner could simply tell
the borrower what the password is. The camera's software could
constantly remind the owner that lending is not allowed; however,
it would also have to remind the owner of all other limitations-
requiring the owner to read and comprehend them-again
undercutting the goal of reallocating information costs to
automated systems.
In summary, while it may be possible to significantly lower
information costs associated with idiosyncratic licenses, the
technology necessary to do so comes with its own set of problems
and potential harms. Lowering information costs with technology
may prove ineffective, prevent some necessary uses of property,
and undermine important privacy values.
V. CONCLUSION
In 1928, Zechariah Chafee concluded his exploration of
equitable servitudes on chattels with the observation that "the
present failure to enforce such restrictions has not caused obvious
evils .... Until the need for ... servitudes on chattels becomes
more certain, they are not likely to acquire assured validity."170
The need for servitudes on chattels never became certain, but
"servitudes" have nonetheless evolved with vigor in the realm of
a user is copying part of a work for purposes of piracy or parody." (citing Edward W. Felten,
A Skeptical View of DRM and Fair Use, Communications of the ACM (Apr. 2003) at 57, 58)).
169 See, e.g., Canon EOS-1D Mark II N Firmware License Agreement, http://web.canon.jp/I
maging/eosldm2nleosldmk2n firmware-e.html (last visited June 18, 2016) (cited in Winston,
supra note 10, at 97 n.13).
170 Chafee 1928, supra note 21, at 1013.
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intellectual-property-embedded goods. 171 This Article attempts to
explain the historic divergence of servitude law on land and
chattels in terms of the information costs associated with
investigating and understanding property interests. In doing so, it
establishes that the justifications for high standardization in
personal property are similarly applicable to intellectual-property-
embedded goods. As a result, it argues that attempts to create
servitudes on chattels, as well as usage and transfer restrictions
on networked products, should continue to be viewed with
suspicion, particularly in light of the social costs to privacy and
autonomy likely to be associated with their implementation.
171 See Van Houweling, supra note 9, at 924-49.
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